INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL RESPONSES TO DISEASE CONTROL: BEYOND EBOLA AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONFINES
DR. ANDRA LE ROUX-KEMP *
[E]pidemics resemble great warning signs on which the true statesman is able to read that the evolution of his nation has been disturbed to a point which even a careless policy is no longer allowed to overlook…Don't crowd disease point everywhere to deficiencies of society?...Abnormal conditions always produce abnormal situations. War, plague and famine condition each other, and we don't know any period in world history where they did not appear in more or less large measure either simultaneously or following each other.
Rudolf Virchow, REPORT ON THE TYPHUS EPIDEMIC IN UPPER SILESIA 307 (1848).
I. INTRODUCTION
The twentieth major outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease ("EVD") began undetected in December 2013 in Guéckédou, Guinea. A one-year old boy, Emile Oumnoouno, died on 28 December 2013, in Meliandou, Guinea, with symptoms of diarrhea and fever as the first casualty of the current and ongoing EVD outbreak. By early 2014, high fatality rates had already sieged three West 1 African nations: Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. While cholera and Lassa 2 3 fever were first thought to be the likely cause of the fatalities, laboratory confirmation of EVD was received on 23 March 2014; the date on which the 4 Ministry of Health of Guinea notified WHO of its rapidly evolving EVD outbreak. From here on, things progressed rapidly and "members of the United 5 Nations Security Council expressed 'their deep concern over the current outbreak of the Ebola virus in some countries in West Africa'" early in July 2014 as the 6 * Assistant Professor, School of Law at the City University of Hong Kong (HKSAR) and Visiting Research Fellow, School of Law, at the University of the Witwatersrand (South Africa).
worker infections were included, it was stated that a total of 881 confirmed health worker infections have been reported in these three countries and that 513 of these health workers had succumbed due to the infection. And, although the 20 most recent EVD outbreak is now generally regarded as having been contained, it is also important to note that due to widespread under-reporting, the true number of infections and fatalities will never really be known and is widely believed to be considerably higher. 21 Much has already been written on this most recent EVD outbreak-evaluating and dissecting the contributions and failings of the various role-players involved, and considering what can be done differently in future. This article will contribute to this important and ongoing debate and will specifically focus on the international, operational, and national legal frameworks in terms of which large-scale health crises like that of Ebola play out. It will be argued that the very culture and architecture of this transnational legal and operational framework for public health emergencies is isolated from the national realities in which it operates and merely offers a hierarchical authority of what legally ought to be done, with little regard to what is actually necessary and to date of the security implications of widespread outbreaks of lethal infectious diseases." Burci & Quirin, supra note 6.
16. See S.C. Res possible on the ground. In considering the most recent Ebola outbreak, and juxtaposing it with the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ("SARS") outbreak of 2003, it will be shown that a more nuanced transnational legal understanding of public health emergencies is indeed needed-a holistic approach that goes beyond biomedical/scientific and legalistic confines in dealing with disease outbreak and control. It is again important to emphasise here, for the sake of clarity, that this article is exclusively focused on the transnational legal and operational framework in which public health emergencies play out. International humanitarian responses, general public health considerations, as well as other national systemic considerations-like those relating to health systems-although important, will not be considered here. A brief interlude on the methodology of this article also deserves a place here. As already indicated above, much literature exists on the Ebola outbreak, and with the attention now shifting to the Zika virus, it is important to further distinguish the contribution of this article. This article utilizes a primarily transdisciplinary lens in narrating the rise and fall of two notable epidemics of the modern world. A variety of sources, from different disciplines and bases, are used in presenting an easily accessible text that recounts key themes of both epidemics-highlighting similarities and differences, and raising important questions for the future. As with most narrative research methodologies, reliance is also placed on newspaper articles in constructing an account of how the two epidemics played out, each in its own particular time and space. The disease 22 narrative ultimately presented in this article, therefore simultaneously serve as a chronical of the two epidemics, while also reflecting why a more nuanced transnational legal understanding of public health emergencies is indeed needed.
To facilitate this discussion and analysis, the content of this article is divided into four parts. First, in Part II, the lifecycle of two epidemics will be considered, Ebola, and the 2003 SARS outbreak. Considering these two outbreaks and the international legal responses thereto provides a valuable lens through which the multiple layers of disease outbreaks and control from the past to the present can be observed. In Part III, this paper provides an overview of the international legal and operational framework for public health emergencies, confined to references and examples from the two outbreaks selected for and discussed in Part II. Part IV considers the national legal responses of those countries most affected by the recent Ebola outbreak and the 2003 SARS outbreak. Part V discusses the question of whether to quarantine or not. Part VI discusses lessons to be learned, and why knowledge production beyond disciplinary confines is necessary. And finally, Part VII of this article concludes with a critical analysis of two observed failings of the current international legal and operational framework for public health emergencies. In considering the shortcomings of the current framework it will be argued that a more holistic approach to disease control is required that looks beyond disciplinary confines. 
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A. Ebola: Forty Years in the Making of an Epidemic
The unfolding events of the twentieth major global EVD outbreak stands in 23 stark contrast to the first recorded outbreak of EVD in 1976 in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire), and not for the obvious reasons. One would imagine that with the advances in medical technology as well as the knowledge gained from the various major and individualized or isolated cases of Ebola infection over the past forty years that we would have been well-prepared when the most recent outbreak was confirmed on 23 March 2014. We were not, and considering the collective EVD literature available, it seems as though we have made little progress since 1976 with regard to the response to, and management of, this infectious disease. The first outbreak of the acute viral haemorrhagic fever occurred between June and November of 1976 in southern Sudan, with a reported 284 people infected and a 53% infected mortality rate (151 people died). The first 24 identifiable case in Sudan was that of a storekeeper in a cotton factory who became ill on 27 June 1976, and died in hospital on 6 July 1976. Patients 25 presented with influenza-like symptoms, including fever, headache, and joint and muscle pains, and eventually with diarrhea, vomiting, chest pain, pain and dryness of throat, and a rash. Seventy-one percent of the infected patients also had haemorrhagic manifestations. The source town of this outbreak in Sudan 26 was Nzara, which is also believed to have been the source of infection for the outbreak in the Bumba Zone of Zaire, although the link between these two outbreaks could never be established conclusively. 27 The outbreak in Zaire raged only a number of weeks, from 1 September 28 1976 to 24 October 1976, and was localized in the Bumba Zone of the Equateur Region, with most cases recorded within a radius of seventy kilometers of Yambuku. Three hundred and eighteen cases were reported with thirty-eight serologically confirmed survivors. Patient zero in this Zaire outbreak was a fortyfour-year-old male instructor from the local Mission School who started to show symptoms on 1 September 1976, five days after having received an injection of chloroquine at the outpatient clinic of Yambuku Mission Hospital for 23 Much clinical data on EVD, or acute viral haemorrhagic fever as it was then referred to, was collected during its first outbreak in Sudan and Zaire. It was documented, for example, that the incubation period and duration of the disease averaged about one week, that patients presented non-specific symptoms after three to four days, and that some of these non-specific symptoms included a progressively severe sore throat, a maculopapular rash, intractable abdominal pain, and eventually also bleeding from multiple sites, principally the gastrointestinal tract. Laboratory tests confirmed that this constellation of 31 symptoms was caused by a virus morphologically similar to the Marburg virus but immunologically distinct, and it was eventually named the Ebola virus-the name of a river close to the Yambuku village and a word which translates to "Black River" in the local language of Lingala. The spread of the virus was 32 interrupted by, inter alia, isolating patients in their villages, using protective clothing and respirators, and carefully disposing of potentially contaminated excreta. With regard to possible treatments for the disease, it was reported that 33 a total of 201 (200-300 ml each) of plasma containing Ebola virus antibodies in titres of at least 1:64 were obtained and frozen, and that these units were used to treat a laboratory worker injected with the Ebola virus. The Zaire commission described this first outbreak of EVD as follows:
No more dramatic or potentially explosive epidemic of a new acute viral disease has occurred in the world in the past 30 years. The case mortality rate of Ebola haemorrhagic fever in Zaire of 88% is the highest on record expect for rabies infection. In the circumstances it was not surprising that much desired information was never obtained. Delays in recognition, notification to international health agencies, and specific diagnosis of the disease contributed greatly to this outcome. No better example comes to mind to illustrate the need for national disease surveillance and the prompt solicitation of international assistance, nor of the need for the development of international resources, comprising personnel, equipment, transport, communication, and finance, that can be made available in a very few days to cope with such emergencies.
39
The Sudanese commission, in turn, recommended that the following procedure be followed once a possible Ebola case is identified: first, blood specimens must be collected for diagnosis, then a surveillance system must be put in place to identify other cases of influenza-like symptoms with or without haemorrhagic manifestations. Medical staff must wear protective clothing including gowns, 40 gloves and masks (or better respirators), and must disinfect patients' excreta with an effective disinfectant like formaldehyde. A follow-up system must also be 41 put in place to check on those with whom the infected persons have had contact and their temperature must be taken daily, isolating them immediately if there is any indication of a fever. Once a diagnosis is made, convalescent plasma must 42 be dispatched to the geographical areas of concern as soon as possible. The 43 commission also stated that "[w]ith such a simple system, these diseases can be identified, isolated, and patients properly treated." And added that
[w]ith experience, no doubt, more outbreaks of these diseases will be identified. We shall probably find that large outbreaks are rare and can be prevented with simple precautions. However, if appropriate precautions are not taken early, as was the case with the first outbreak of viral haemorrhagic fever in Sudan, these diseases can spread far and wide, and across international borders. The recommendations of the two commissions are still very relevant today because, as in 1976, no vaccine or cure for Ebola exists, and the only way in which to curb the spread of this infectious disease is to break the chains of infection. Health workers must therefore identify people who are infected and isolate them from society. This is pivotal to ensure that no further infections take place, either by way of direct contact with the patient and his or her bodily fluids (like blood or sweat which contains high concentrations of Ebola particles) or by droplet infection. Everybody who has been exposed to the virus (had contact   45 with an infected person) must furthermore be identified and then monitored for the onset of symptoms. This is pivotal as Ebola is extremely infectious. But while this monitoring of such persons at risk is important, draconian measures, like an outright quarantine order, are not necessary as people infected with the Ebola virus only become contagious after they had developed a fever and other symptoms like diarrhea, vomiting, or severe headaches. And, Ebola is furthermore only contagious when the person is symptomatic and the first symptom is almost always a fever, which makes the modern day temperature screening at airports particularly effective.
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After the first major outbreaks of EVD in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire) and Sudan, individualised infections were reported in England and Zaire in 1976 and 1977, respectively. The virus was also identified and isolated in the Philippines in 1989-1990 in a primate facility responsible for exporting animals to the U.S., and in 1989, 1990 and 1996 outbreak of EVD in the Democratic Republic of Congo ("DRC") was in August/November 2014 in multiple villages across the DRC, an outbreak that was completely unrelated to the ongoing outbreak of Ebola in West Africa.
63
Given the reports and recommendations by the International Commissions to Zaire and Sudan in 1976-both stressing the need for national disease surveillance and the prompt solicitation of international assistance as well as the prophetic warnings that large outbreaks, while imminent and potentially disastrous, can be prevented with simple precautions-the question can rightly be asked how it is even possible for the public health emergency of the most recent Ebola outbreak to have come about. Given our experience and knowledge of EVD over the past forty plus years, how can it be that the most recent outbreak of Ebola got so out of control with a death toll of over 28,000 Yet, while the Ebola virus has been forty years in the making, with many thousands of people having died in its wake, the SARS outbreak was comparatively short and less severe. Georges Benjamin, the executive director of the American Public Health Association, described it as follows: "…SARS was not 'the big one.' It did, however, cost over USD $40 billion and served as a global wake-up call."
69
Contrary to the mass of information available on Ebola before its most recent outbreak, scientists from both the developed and less developed countries were equally unaware as to the cause of SARS, the ways in which to diagnose it, the treatments, and the precautionary measures that should be taken to prevent its 74 Canadian scientists successfully sequenced the DNA of the then yet unknown coronavirus, and today we know that SARS is a form of atypical pneumonia caused by a new strain of the coronavirus, which is generally referred to as the SARS virus ("SARS-CoV"). It is believed that SARS-CoV is an animal virus 75 that crossed the species barrier to humans due to ecological changes and changes in human behavior that increased human exposure to the virus and also fostered virus adaptation ultimately enabling human-to-human transmission. The animal 76 reservoir for the SARS-CoV pathogen is furthermore believed to be vast, and includes wildlife species like the Himalayan masked palm civet, the Chinese ferret badger, and the raccoon dog, all of which are consumed as delicacies in southern China. Domestic cats and ferret have also been found to be infected with, and able to infect other animals with, the SARS virus. Curiously, patient having already infected his wife and two of his sisters.
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The clinical features of SARS can range from a severe form of respiratory disease, after which the syndrome was named, to other milder and more atypical (non-specific) flu-like or pneumonia symptoms. A real risk exists for the disease 79 not to be correctly diagnosed without supportive epidemiological and laboratory testing; therefore, a high level of awareness about the spectrum of disease caused by SARS must always be maintained amongst health professionals, especially in South-east Asia where the epidemic originated. SARS is transmitted by way of 80 respiratory exudates and contaminated surfaces on membranes of the mouth, nose or eyes. The most effective epidemic control measures for this virus is 81 therefore-in addition to the early detection, isolation and treatment of those infected-to reduce population contact and promote personal and environmental hygiene.
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The disease is furthermore characterized by rapid transmission and a high mortality rate. For example, in the absence of any control measures, an average 83 of two to four people can be infected by each SARS patient; in contrast to the Ebola virus where the incubation period can be anywhere between two to twentyone days, the incubation period for SARS is only ten days. For this reason, the 84 potential severity of a SARS outbreak should not be under-estimated as the SARS virus is sufficiently infectious to cause a very large epidemic if unchecked, but is completely controllable with public health measures such as early detection, quarantine and medical treatment. While much has been learned about the virus, 85 knowledge about its epidemiology and ecology remains incomplete; although the most probable sources of infections with SARS-Cov today would result from exposure in laboratories, the possibility of the re-emergence of SARS in epidemic form is not impossible.
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The countries hardest hit by the SARS epidemic, which ranged from 1 Despite the marked differences in the lifecycle and impact of the 2003 SARS outbreak compared to that of the most recent Ebola epidemic, remarkable similarities exist. For example, just as the most recent Ebola outbreak is still ongoing and is generally described in terms of its failures, the 2003 SARS outbreak is far from forgotten and is generally still presented in literature as "a medieval plague, a medical disaster and an economic blight." Similarities also 92 exist in the manner in which these two public health emergencies were dealt with. Similar to the initial denial of the seriousness of the most recent Ebola outbreak by international organisations and national governments alike, there was also a "high-profile denial" by the Chinese government, and later also the Hong Kong authorities about the true nature, seriousness and extent of the spread of SARS.
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And to those affected by Ebola, residents in Hong Kong and China were also reported to have felt abandoned and uninformed about the diagnosis, treatment and transmission mechanism of SARS, adding to feelings of uncertainty and trepidation in the wake of the disease. 94 By some standards, the SARS outbreak was certainly not the most severe of the epidemics that have plagued the world. Yet, it reminded us of how real the threat of a global epidemic is, and how vulnerable we still are despite all the medical and technological advances that we have privy to today. The SARS outbreak is also noteworthy for another reason; as the first emerging new epidemic of the age of globalization in which we live today, most stakeholders would say that it was contained rather effectively and efficiently in less than four months since its outbreak was announced, which makes the calamity of the most recent Ebola outbreak all the more problematic.
III. INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES TO PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
A. The International Legal Framework for Public Health Emergencies
The first organised institutional responses to disease control date back to the of convalescent cholera carriers, of mild or unapparent infections, and of the gall bladder as a reservoir of cholera vibrios were trumpeted as new discoveries in the 1960s, the records of the conferences actually show that these concepts were already universally accepted "some sixty or more years ago." This phenomenon 104 is also evident from the historical overview on the Ebola virus provided above, where it was evident that our experience and knowledge of EVD accumulated over the past forty years was easily "forgotten" and did little to ensure appropriate, timeous, and effective action with the most recent outbreak. A case in point is an article published in The Lancet on 9 May 2015 in which it is said that "[t]he unfamiliarity of Ebola delayed its detection." This is simply not true.
105
For four decades, these "Sanitary" conferences failed to produce on its promise of delivering internationally agreed upon standards for the regulation and control of infectious diseases due to the "utter ignorance of the causes of the epidemic diseases . . . [proving] . . . an insuperable barrier to international agreement." However, "as the etiologies of cholera, then plague, and later 106 yellow fever were unraveled, the pace of international health cooperation quickened, leading to the foundation, one after the other, of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, the Office International d'Hygiène publique, the Health who all accept and agree to the basic principles on which the WHO is based for the purpose of fostering and enabling co-operation amongst member states in order to promote and protect the health of all peoples. These principles include a commitment to health as a state of complete physical, mental, and social wellbeing, and the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of this health as a fundamental right of every human being. The objectives of the Organization 111 are set out in Article 2 of its Constitution which confirms the WHO's coordinating authority and duty to establish and ensure effective collaboration between member states, and to provide technical, normative, material and operational support in all matters related to health, including public health issues in general, and health emergencies specifically. The WHO has certainly 112 developed into a (potentially) powerful institution from its early years with only sixty-one members to today, with its headquarters in Geneva, six strategically positioned regional offices, and representation by more than 7,000 people-including medical doctors, public health specialists, scientists and epidemiologists-from over 150 countries, territories and areas.
113
With the recent Ebola outbreak, the WHO collaborated with the U.N. Mission for Ebola Emergency Response ("UNMEER") and U.N. agency partners like UNICEF, W FP, OCHA, UNFPA and UNDP, as well as other international partners like the African Union, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control ("CDC"), MSF, the International Federation of the Red Cross ("IFRC"), the International Organization for Migration ("IOM"), UNAIDS, and partners of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network ("GOARN"). An Ebola Response Roadmap was also drafted by the WHO in August 2014, setting out the primary strategy for curbing the Ebola outbreak and to provide the basis for a significantly increased response. This was followed by the U.N.'s Overview of Needs and 114 Requirements ("ONR") and the STEPP Strategy which "were designed to assist governments and partners in the revision and resourcing of country-specific operational plans for the Ebola response, and to aid the coordination of international support to fully implement those plans." timelines and given its contemporaneous establishment, UNMEER basically had to define itself and its approach in the midst of the full-blown emergency.
120
Much more can be said about the coordination bodies and mechanisms that inhabit the top echelons of our international society on matters relating to health, and, for the purpose of this paper, public health emergencies. Indeed, some aspects of the international legal framework for public health emergencies will again be considered in Part IV below, for now, the remainder of the discussion in Part III will rather focus on The International Health Regulations (2005); the most important and only existing international legal instrument for the management and coordination of large-scale public health emergencies.
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B. The International Health Regulations (IHR 2005)
Article 21 of the Constitution of the WHO empowers the World Health Assembly-the highest decision-making body of the WHO-to adopt regulations on matters including those related to "sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the international spread of disease." The IHR (1969) was limited in scope and only dealt with specific diseases, namely, the plague, cholera and yellow fever. The Regulations to the IHR 126 (1969) set out measures to be taken by the member states to prevent the spread of disease, and it also prescribed minimum standards for sanitation and public health facilities at air and sea ports. Provisions were also made for prescribed 127 mandatory and permitted health measures as well as maximum measures that must be applied during times of an epidemic. For example, Part IV of the IHR (1969) contained provisions on the restrictions to be imposed on inbound and outbound international travel or movement of goods, and Article 23 provided for, inter alia, the application and/or prohibition of certain measures under specific circumstances.
128
While this first version of an internationally agreed-upon and binding legal instrument for global disease surveillance and control was indeed a significant development in global health at the time, it also proved to be wholly inadequate and unsatisfactory. The most obvious shortcoming was the limited scope of the IHR (1969) and its regulations. The HIV/AIDS pandemic, the SARS epidemic, and the threat of an influenza pandemic, for example, fell outside the scope and operation of the IHR (1969). States' compliance with the IHR (1969) were 129 poor; given that the WHO is dependent on notifications and information by States in order for it to fulfill its technical, normative and operational functions, the noncompliance of States rendered it effectively useless. But while member States 130 were in agreement that the IHR (1969) had to be revised, the discussion and the consultation processes were protracted-similar to the Sanitary Conventions discussed in the preceding sections-and it was only after the SARS epidemic in 2003 and the growing fears of avian influenza and a possible large-scale influenza Thus, while the most recent Ebola outbreak brought us the "historic" pronouncement by the U.N. Security Council and the establishment of UNMEER (although only temporarily), the 2003 SARS outbreak was the catalyst for the revised International Health Regulations (2005) ("IHR (2005)") that is currently in place and that is described as "one of the most radical and far-reaching changes to international law on public health since the beginning of international health co-operation in the mid-nineteenth century." As was indicated in Part II above, 132 the SARS 2003 outbreak was indeed not one of the most severe epidemics that the world has ever had to face, but it is generally regarded as the "first severe and readily transmissible new disease to emerge in the twenty-fist century" and it placed under the spotlight the potentially catastrophic reality of infectious disease in a globalized world. (2005) is geared towards the prevention, protection against, control and the providing for a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade. 135 Numerous important differences between the IHR (1969) and the IHR (2005), however, can also be observed. For example, the scope of the IHR (1969) was limited to only three diseases, but the scope of the IHR (2005) is centered on notions of "events" or on a "public health emergency of international concern" which not only applies to the spread of natural diseases, but also to the accidental or intentional release of biological, chemical, or radiological agents if it could lead to the international spread of disease and irrespective of origin or source. 136 The range and nature of disease events covered under the IHR (2005) diseases to which the algorithm must always be applied, as it is either presumed that these diseases are always potentially of international concern or it is presumed that the occurrence of these diseases is both unusual or unexpected and serious, and should therefore be classified as a PHEIC. Viral haemorrhagic (2005) is the translation of the global ethos for health put forward by the WHO, in terms of the national public health capacities of member States. While the IHR (1969) merely contained a limited set of prescriptions for organization, equipment, facilities, and services required at national ports and airports (Part III of the IHR (1969)), the IHR (2005) also requires of its signatorystates to take a number of measures to prevent, respond, and to control the spread of disease and to implement these obligations within its domestic legal and public health systems. It is particularly important that the IHR obligations are incorporated and implemented in national legal and public health systems as it not only gives effect to the objectives of the IHR, but also provides the much needed "framework (or backbone) for a range of public health activities and specific operational functions." The core capacities or minimum set of It was evident from the discussion in Part III above that the lack of consensus on the biomedical causes of epidemic diseases initially proved an insuperable barrier to international agreement. This is certainly no longer the case today. The IHR (1969), in turn, was limited in scope and completely irrelevant to the 2003 SARS outbreak, yet the response to SARS is generally considered to be a success story for both the WHO and the international community at large. However, while the IHR (2005) is described as "unprecedented in the history of the relationship between international law and public health," and was fully operational during the most recent Ebola outbreak, the international response and coordination was found to be wholly inadequate and lacking. 144 
IV. NATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES TO PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
There are, of course, many factors that exist locally, at the heart of an epidemic, that contribute directly to the spread (and curb) of infectious diseases and other public health emergencies. Some of these factors are related to political regimes and histories, governance, health financing and health systems, or to the availability of essential medicines, supplies and delivery services. Yet others relate to human resources, education, and specific social and cultural features of While much scholarly research has since been devoted to these and other contributory factors, the contribution of this particular section of the article will be limited to an evaluation of the national legal responses to public health emergencies, and particularly the use of quarantine measures and bylaws as instruments of behavioural change. It will be shown in this section that these national legal responses to public health emergencies are not always properly informed and tailored to meet the needs and circumstances of the communities they are intended to serve, nor are they necessarily warranted in terms of biomedical evidence. National legal responses to public health emergencies are rather often informed by fear and based on distrust, the effects of which move across time, space, and boundaries within and between international and national actors, communities, and individuals. It will be evident from the discussion 147 below that actors often leverage scientific uncertainty according to their political interests.
148
A. Bylaws as Instruments of Behavioral Change
In trying to curb the further spread of EVD in Sierra Leone, the remote 149 areas of Kailahun, Kenema, and Koinadugu adopted the central government's emergency state laws, which were declared on 31 July 2014 and extended twice in combination with district/chiefdom bylaws. prohibiting certain customary and informal practices of local peoples in caring for the sick and dying. Examples of the sanctions imposed on breaching these bylaws included the following: A person could incur a fine of up to 200,000Le for tending a sick person in their home or a fine of 500,00Le for washing the body of a deceased person. It was submitted that "the risk of [such] immediate and 151 locally enforced penalties" proved to be effective "even when the threat of severe health consequences for the behavior is not." Yet, it has been observed that 152 these bylaws had more force as a deterrent than as punitive instruments.
153
Generally speaking and for the remote areas of Sierra Leone specifically, these bylaws proved to be effective to a certain extent in forging behavioural change. Its success was ascribed to the following factors: The residents of these areas are accustomed to the passage of informal bylaws by Chiefs, and "the psychological frame and infrastructure" of enforcement and the collection of fines already existed before the bylaws came into existence. The District Councils, 154 local councilors, and Paramount Chiefs of these districts also collaborated, adopted each other's best practices, and crafted and implemented the bylaws as a united and legitimate source. The remoteness of these three areas from the What is interesting, however, is that insofar as these bylaws related to changing customary burial practices, effecting behavioural change proved to be more difficult. In fact, it is estimated that up to one half of Ebola related deaths 2018) , http://www.ebolaa n t h r o p o l o g y . n e t / t h e m e / m a n a ge me n t -o f -t h e -d e a d / ? p o s t _ t yp e = k e y_ m e s s a g e s [https://perma.cc/FJ3B-HS7V] (describing detailed anthropological narratives on culture and burial practices in the most recent Ebola outbreak Africa, similar concerns were not as prevalent in Hong Kong during the SARS outbreak. Not only is the epidemiology of these two infectious diseases obviously different, but in Hong Kong, people usually die in hospitals or other care facilities and their remains are removed and taken care of by the assigned public health services or a funeral parlour. Thus, a National Standard Operating Procedure 165 ("SOP") that takes into account specific customary needs and cultural rituals, and includes-for as far as possible-community and family members in the burial process, was not as significant for Hong Kong during the SARS outbreak as it was in rural Africa with the most recent Ebola outbreak. Yet, each geographical 166 territory may offer unique challenges and/or considerations when it comes to the outbreak and control of infectious diseases. In Hong Kong, for example, the remains of the deceased who had died from a particularly infectious disease and whose remains may still pose some risk upon exhumation can, under certain circumstances, prove pivotal.
Sylvanus Spencer therefore warns that the mere "translation" of biomedical and legal measures into local idioms to effect behavioural change in efforts to control disease outbreaks may not be enough. He submits that a full understanding of "the heterogeneity of social factors and the multiplicity of actors inserting agency in the translation" of intervention measures is ultimately necessary. Noteworthy in this regard is that the interdependent self-concepts 167 so characteristic of traditional African (and also Asian) cultures may have contributed to the relative success of bylaws in effecting behavioural change in the context of the recent Ebola outbreak. Yet, such an interdependent self-concept that emphasises group goals and the appreciation of communalities with others, stands in stark contrast to the independent self-concepts usually associated with Western cultures which places more emphasis on personal goals and recognition of one's differences from other people. Thus, whether the enforcement of State 168 emergency regulations as well as the enactment and abidance of more informal regulatory measures by local authoritative figures would be equally effective in effecting behavioural change in the face of a public health emergency in a typical Western cultural context, is indeed questionable.
V. TO QUARANTINE OR NOT TO QUARANTINE: A LEGAL OR PUBLIC HEALTH QUESTION?
The first known incidence of a medical quarantine-in terms of which people believed that the battle against infectious diseases has largely been won in light of medical advances and the availability of vaccines and antibiotics. Quarantine 172 is therefore often described as "a relic of the past, useless, and damaging to commerce." However, to date, the centuries-old strategy of quarantine remains 173 an important component of the public health response to emerging and reemerging infectious diseases, as well as potential acts of biological terrorism.
175
The Siracusa Principles make specific provision, for example, for the limitation of rights in situations of public emergency, and particularly on grounds of public health "in order to allow a state to take measures dealing with a serious threat to the health of the population or individual members of the population. These measures must be specifically aimed at preventing disease or injury or providing care for the sick and injured. concerns that have been raised with regard to quarantine in terms of the Ebola and SARS epidemics will briefly be considered here, for as far as it is relevant to the argument presented in this article. The CDC defines quarantine as the separation of an individual or group reasonably believed to have been exposed to a quarantinable communicable disease but who is not yet ill (not presenting signs or symptoms), from others 177 who have not been so exposed, in order to prevent the possible spread of the quarantinable communicable disease. Isolation, on the other hand, refers to the 178 separation of an individual or group who is reasonably believed to already be infected with a quarantinable communicable disease from those who are not infected, in order to prevent the spread of the particular disease. While both 179 quarantine and isolation have at aim to prevent the spread of a quarantinable communicable disease, quarantine applies to individuals or groups who are reasonably believed to have been exposed to a quarantinable communicable disease, and isolation applies to individuals or groups who are reasonably believed to have already been infected with such a disease. Controlled movement, in contrast, only limits the movement of people, animals or goods with regard to long distance commercial conveyances (e.g. aircraft, ship, bus or train) and/or other public transportation (e.g. bus or subway). 177. In the U.S., the following communicable diseases are subject to federal authorization for isolation and quarantine: cholera, Diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic fevers, severe acute respiratory syndromes, and flu that can cause a pandemic. 204. CDC, supra note 178 (explaining that active monitoring places an obligation on the state or local public health authority to establish regular contact with potentially exposed individuals, including checking daily to assess for the presence of symptoms, including fever, rather than relying solely on the individuals to self-monitor and report on their symptoms).
205. Cetron & Landwirth, supra note 180, at 327 (noting that the responsibility for public health matters in the U.S. rests on both the federal and state governments. Relevant state laws, regulations and procedures vary widely and the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act is described by Cetron and Landwirth as an attempt to promote greater inter-state consistency in response to emergency public health situations. Federal powers for quarantine is delegated to the CDC who is empowered to make quarantine regulations in terms of § 361 of the Public Health Service Act, USC Title 42, Chapter 6A, Part G that the transmission of EVD requires "bodily fluid or blood contact, mandatory quarantine of asymptomatic healthcare workers who are expected to comply with active health monitoring by public health authorities provides no substantial benefit and little, if any, theoretical benefit." It was also argued that such an 209 overreaction may further stigmatize the disease and those infected with it, instill fear in the public, encourage people to hide their travel history, and discourage health workers from volunteering to fight Ebola in Africa.
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The stringent requirements with regard to the twenty-one-day mandatory quarantine period was eventually relaxed, instead requiring that people returning from West Africa be confined to their own homes for twenty-one days (the incubation period of the virus) and that they be checked twice daily by public showed any symptoms of Ebola and it was reported that she intends on "suing Christie and other state officials for $250,000, alleging false imprisonment, invasion of privacy and violation of due process, among other claims." It was 214 the escalation of these events that ultimately led to the CDC issuing their Revised Interim U.S. Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with Ebola Virus Exposure, as well as additional guidelines recommending how people with direct exposure to Ebola patients or burials should be dealt with, to avoid further confusion of state-by-state policies. These federal monitoring rules require 215 State and local health departments to contact travelers returning from the Ebolastricken countries in West Africa on a daily basis for twenty-one consecutive days and to check for any symptoms including a high fever.
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The above narrative on the unfolding of quarantine measures in the "groundzero" African countries where the Ebola outbreak started, as well as in the U.S. where isolated incidences of infection were recorded, reveals a tale of swift and severe action by state officials in imposing quarantine measures driven by fear and panic, and not necessarily based on sound scientific and medical evidence. 215. CDC, supra note 178 (noting that the new monitoring system came into effect on Monday 27 October in six states-New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, New Jersey and Georgia-and was eventually expanded across the country); see also N.Y. TIMES, supra note 203 (noting the additional guidelines provided, for example, that a person at a high risk of Ebola be strongly advised "and if necessary, even ordered by health authorities . . . to avoid traveling or congregating in public").
216. N.Y. TIMES, supra note 203 (noting twenty-one days is the maximum period for symptoms to develop). 217. Id. will briefly be relayed here. On 14 March 2003, only two days after the WHO issued a global alert about SARS, an infection was reported in Toronto, which prompted the WHO in issuing an emergency travel advisory warning that the new disease was spreading worldwide and asking travelers to be wary of SARS symptoms and to report to airport personnel if they or fellow passengers showed any signs of the disease. who also added Singapore and Hanoi to the list of countries.
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In addition to these travel advisories, quarantine and isolation measures on the ground also progressed rapidly. On 31 March 2003, the Hong Kong Health Department issued an isolation order requiring "all residents of an entire apartment block into self-quarantine until April 9." A day later, however, after 228 having found the initial quarantine to be ineffective, all the residents of the apartment block were relocated to an isolation camp. Unfortunately, due to the 229 secrecy with which the Chinese government approached their handling of the SARS outbreak, very little is known about quarantine and isolation measures on the Chinese mainland. However, reports exist indicating that 10,000 people were quarantined in the eastern Chinese city of Nanjing, and that more than 15,000 people were quarantined in Beijing, where the city's eighty water reservoirs were sealed off from the public in an effort to prevent the virus from entering the city's water supply. Entertainment venues and schools were closed and recreational 230 activities halted in the capitol city of Beijing. In Toronto, the only city outside 231 Asia to eventually be included under the WHO travel advisory (23 April 2003), approximately 7,000 people were quarantined. Noteworthy about the Canadian quarantine measures, however, is that people who may have been exposed to SARS were asked to voluntarily quarantine themselves. And in Taiwan,   232 131,132 people were placed under home quarantine, of which only twelve were found to be potential cases of SARS, and only two were confirmed to have SARS. Similar to the effects that quarantine and isolation measures had in 233 Africa with the Ebola outbreak, economic losses were also reported worldwide as a result of the measures imposed during the SARS outbreak. For example, on 9 April 2003, Australia's Qantas airlines cut approximately 3% of its workforce in the wake of the SARS outbreak, and various other airlines also reported financial losses as a result of cuts in flights. Hong Kong's economy "sputtered 234 miserably in the wake of SARS" and damning reports by experts like James Hughes of the National Center for Infectious Diseases in Atlanta, Georgia, did not Another similarity between the quarantine measures of the Ebola and SARS outbreaks relate to the use of force in effecting the separation and confinement of persons in an effort to control the spread of the disease. In Beijing, it was reported that the police cordoned off buildings, organized checkpoints on roads, and even installed web-cameras in private homes.
Stronger control was 238 furthermore exerted over persons in the lower social strata, with village-level governments being empowered, for example, to isolate workers from SARSaffected areas. Repressive police-type measures by public health officials were also reported in some areas, and laws were promulgated prescribing "extremely severe punishments (including the death penalty), against those who violated quarantine." People, in turn, reacted forcefully to these violent measures 239 imposed in the name of "Public Health" and it was reported that in remote areas of China, residents destroyed quarantine centres and attacked government officials.
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Similar incidences of violence were also reported during the recent Ebola outbreak, during which the use of military force in effecting quarantines seemed to be prevalent. In Monrovia, Liberia, fear and resentment after the government placed an entire neighbourhood under strict quarantine, together with general social and political tensions, created an explosive atmosphere that culminated in populist rebellions and uprisings. This ultimately led to the death of a fifteen-241 year-old boy, who was shot, and four other residents wounded, when angry residents clashed with security forces.
The appropriateness of using such 242 security forces in maintaining quarantines in Liberia and Sierra Leone was questioned when allegations came to the fore that many security officers had been The appropriateness and effectiveness of quarantine as a public health strategy in curbing the spread of infectious diseases has long been contested: first during the yellow fever outbreak of the eighteenth century, when French Revolutionary ideals fostered an affirmation for citizen's rights and personal freedom, and later by way of the discerning voices of mid-nineteenth century scientists dismissing quarantine as irrelevant in the prevention of cholera.
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Quarantine restrains personal liberty, is a method of temporary detention, is an inconvenience, and can be potentially dangerous when healthy-but-suspected disease carriers are quarantined together with the sick. Quarantine strategies are often accompanied by an undercurrent of suspicion, distrust, and sometimes also result in riots and other forms of violence, as was evident from the Ebola and SARS examples referred to above.
Finally, it must also be noted that, Gostin, is a function of two things: probability that harm will occur and the severity of that harm, should it transpire. Gostin further explains that these two 256 factors have a roughly inverse relationship: "the more severe the potential harm, the less the probability, or risk, we are willing to assume." Yet, people are not 257 always rational actors and people do not always assess reasonably the risk that they pose to others, or the risk that they may subject themselves to in certain situations or under certain circumstances.
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Related to this notion of risk and how "rational" people are expected to act, it must also be noted, as it was in the previous section of this part with regard to the effectiveness of bylaws in bringing about behavioural change, that cultural factors may also play a role. Noel Brewer from the University of North Carolina's Gillings School of Global Public Health, in juxtaposing Western American values with that of Asian cultures, articulates it as follows:
Part of the problem is cultural…Americans tend to think more about individual than communal rights and are understandably dubious of medical mandates that seem to be always changing. Americans also value movement by health officials.); Tognotti, supra note 83, at 256. toughness and the ability to work through physical adversity without thinking how they might end up weakening other members of a team. Contrast this with many Asian countries where it's common to see people wearing surgical masks in public. Tellingly, Americans tend to assume this is to prevent the mask wearer from getting sick. But it's actually more often the reverse: The wearer is sick and the mask serves not only to prevent passing germs to others but also to alert people that the wearer is unwell and they should keep their distance.
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Thus, to conclude this part on the national legal responses to the public health emergencies posed by the Ebola and SARS outbreaks, the obvious-which is often forgotten in moments of health panic-needs to be restated: quarantine can undoubtedly-in the absence of effective pharmaceutical interventions, and only if it is the least restrictive means available/necessary to protect public health-serve as an acceptable public health measure to contain infection, to delay the spread of disease, to avert terror and death, and to maintain the infrastructure of society. Unfortunately, however, too many examples exist of 260 how quarantine strategies have been misused and abused. As a rule of thumb, quarantine strategies may be warranted and effective when it is based on sound scientific and medical information, is the result of a rational decision-making process that takes into consideration the particularities of the specific circumstances and disease, and is implemented and enforced in a manner that promotes trust and certainty, rather than cultivating fear, panic and suspicion. In other words, the restriction on the freedom and liberty of persons in the name of public health or a public emergency must meet the requirements of "legality, evidence-based necessity, and proportionality." The illusion that safety can be 261 assured by keeping those who are dangerous away should be heeded against at all cost, and the duty is ultimately on the state to show that there is no less onerous way to reduce the risk of contagion.
VI. LESSONS TO BE LEARNT: WHY KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION BEYOND DISCIPLINARY CONFINES IS NECESSARY
A. Failings of International Legal Frameworks for and Responses to Disease Control
Given the history and background of the existing international legal framework for disease control and public health emergencies, two major shortcomings can be identified: the first relates to the IHR (2005) Bank, African Development Bank and European Union specifically focusing on the most recent Ebola outbreak highlighted the poor pre-Ebola implementation of these regulations, noting that "systems for early warning and response were inadequate, lacked necessary accountability and links with or support from national disaster management mechanisms and were not prepared to scale up response to this kind and scale of epidemic." international collaboration to form an "extensive global public health reserve workforce to counter crises and outbreaks of disease" in the aftermath of the swine flu epidemic of 2010, the world has yet to respond to these recommendations, recommendations that could have made a real difference in the outcome of the recent Ebola outbreak had they been in place. Evidence of this can be gleaned from both the recent Ebola outbreak as well as the 2003 SARS outbreak. For example, in 2013, Sierra Leone and Liberia ranked second and sixth among the top ten countries with the highest GDP growth in the world, and Guinea had high hopes for its Simandou iron ore project on to which numerous international investors had signed. Today, the economies of both 269 these countries are still recovering in the aftermath of the Ebola outbreak. Nigeria, in turn, where only twenty cases were reported, witnessed a 40% drop in demand for goods and services in its largest economic hub, Lagos. And even 270 Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, where no cases were reported, experienced an economic impact with international conferences being cancelled, reduced flights, and fewer tourists.
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Particularly interesting about the economic impact of the most recent Ebola outbreak in Africa was the observation that "the largest economic effects of the crisis are not as a result of the direct costs (mortality, morbidity, caregiving, and associated losses to working days) but rather those resulting from aversion behavior driven by fear of contagion." This fear was stoked by inaccurate and 272 implausible claims by international institutions like the WHO and the CDC. An early example of how data was misleadingly represented was the WHO statements from April through August 2014 that the death rate from Ebola was up to 90%, while the actual death rate from confirmed cases, even in the early days in March 2014 in Guinea, was about 70%. Both the WHO and the CDC 273 misjudged how the disease would evolve, both overestimated likely cases, and the CDC projected that up to 1.4 million people in Liberia and Sierra Leone could be infected by January 2015, while only 19,140 cases had been reported in both countries by 27 January 2015. In October 2014, the World Bank estimated that 274 the total costs associated with Ebola for West Africa were as high as $32.6 billion, an estimate which was revised in January 2015 to $6 billion at most. 275 Such inaccurate and implausible claims stoked panic and ultimately had direct and indirect economic consequences for the countries concerned. 276 Most vulnerable in the face of such misleading information is the informal economy, where farmers are often unable to organize work teams which in turn affects harvests and lead to food insecurity and women are unable to sell their goods at markets and other public places due to the debilitating effect of fear on people to make use of public transport or to gather in public places. Such indirect economic consequences were particularly evident in Sierra Leone, where no differences were found in labor impacts between quarantined and nonquarantined districts.
Fear was also the primary determinant of behavior 277 curbing economic activity, and is estimated to have contributed as much as 80% to 90% of the total economic impact of the SARS epidemic in 2002-2004, an epidemic that cost the world economy a staggering USD $40 billion.
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The economic repercussions of having a PHEIC declared within a country's borders are therefore a real and valid concern. But in the aftermath of the most recent outbreak of an epidemic, and particularly in light of the calamity thereof, we have to consider what this means for forging a robust international response framework for the spread of infectious disease. A project that we seemingly continue to fail at as epidemics continue to overwhelm the international epidemic bulwark. There are no simple solutions to this complex problem, the multifacetedness of which was evident from the transdisciplinary narration of the two health panics described above. The remainder of this part of the article will focus on two identified shortcomings of the international legal and operational framework for public health emergencies and disease control: the first being who the relevant body is that should take primary responsibility in case of an epidemic or other public health emergency, and the second question being how the coordination of such a public health event should be informed and steered.
B. Who is Responsible? From State Sovereignty to Collective Responsibility
A possible reason for the inability of the international community to forge a robust international framework for the spread of infectious disease can be found in the very nature of international law, and became apparent early on in the consultation process to the IHR (2005 Likewise, international human rights law can also be used to frame the rights of peoples and the obligations of states in a public health emergency. Coomans argues that a public health emergency is ultimately a matter relating to the right to health, and signatories to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") are obliged to progressively realize the right of 286 people to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health under Article 12(1). States must therefore progressively realize and 287 ensure that a minimum core of a properly functioning health system and infrastructure, as well as adequate health-system capacity, exists for people to gain access to health services. Article 12(2) furthermore specifically states that 288 the full realization of the right to health include actions relating to the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases, and the creation of conditions which should ensure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.
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In moving beyond the immediate responsibilities of States, the international community also has responsibilities with regard to public health emergencies under international law. The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has said "given that some diseases are easily transmissible beyond the frontiers of a State, there is a collective responsibility on the international community to address this problem. The economically developed States parties have a special responsibility and interest to assist the poorer developing States in this regard." And, Article 2(1) of the ICESCR provides that state parties should 290 realize the rights in the Covenant "individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical." Brigit also 291 submits that this international "duty to aid" under human rights law is congruent humanitarian aid organizations, and the pharmaceutical industry are not directly bound by standards of international or global health law, Brigit argues that they have moral duties to comply with human rights standards, including the right to health. This moral duty, Brigit argues, is particularly warranted given the influence and power of these non-state actors over the health and well-being of people.
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However, and as was already indicated above, while international legal instruments like the IHR (2005) and the concomitant obligations that it places on member States requires an inevitable compromise between national sovereignty and the collective international good, these obligations remain-like many others in the realm of international law-mere ideals subject to competing claims and intricate political and economic negotiations. In the next section therefore, the discussion will return to the national level, and more specifically to the people directly affected by the outbreak of disease.
C. Revisiting the 'How': Knowledge Production beyond the Boundaries of Disciplinary Confines
Article 43(2) of the IHR (2005) requires that all health measures prescribed in the IHR (2005), including how and when a PHEIC is declared, be informed and directed in terms of bio-medical knowledge. No mention is made, however, 294 of the social and cultural contexts in which public health emergencies play out, and how context specific information about the environment, relevant social and cultural factors, and even political considerations, should inform health measures and strategies. Moreover, the predominant top-down approach so archetypical of legal and regulatory frameworks does little to foster communication and trust, and essentially sidelines community engagement as a critical operational tool. This 295 is not only regrettable but ultimately also counter-intuitive to the public health ideal as community engagement is an essential resource in any public health emergency. It is, for example, through community engagement that people are equipped with the knowledge, capabilities and support to prevent themselves and others from falling prey to an emerging or ongoing epidemic-large-scale fear and resistance to health authorities as well as stigmatisation can be reduced, safe and supportive practices of care for those already infected can be ensured, and safe burial practices promoted. Yet, the social and cultural contexts in which 296 public health emergencies play out are often ignored and are definitely not considered in terms of the execution and operation of international and national legal frameworks. International responses to disease outbreaks usually regard local culture as an impediment, and place overt emphasis on a strategy that "places responsibility for disease transmissions on individuals who are expected to reject 'negative' behaviours such as communical eating or burial traditions, while failing to provide sufficient resources to those same individuals to enable their 'appropriate' management of the disease." The most recent Ebola outbreak is 297 a case in point-assumptions about local ignorance and capabilities led to false attributions being made to the indigenous peoples of the affected areas and their culture, while much of the community resistance was not related to indigenous traditions "but [rather] basic issues like people seeing family members taken away and never getting news about where they end up or how they are doing."
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Such stereotypes not only feed paternalism, but the consequences thereof directly impact the international and national legal and regulatory responses to public health emergencies. It has been said, for example, that "[t]he apparent result is a predisposition in the aid system towards control and an inflated sense of its own importance, rather than responses and strategies that engage with and rely on communities, and demand action from them."
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A new integrated approach is therefore required for international norm-setting that is holistic, multidisciplinary, and globally oriented. The strictures of disciplinary boundaries, whether biomedical or legalistic, are rigid, hierarchical, and often keep us from effectively responding to health needs and impediments on the ground. This was indeed evident from the most recent Ebola outbreak where the troubling gap and powerful potential of community engagement stood glaring in the aftermath of many lives lost. Such a call for a more integrated 300 approach beyond disciplinary confines is indeed not novel, but was already articulated shortly after the 2003 SARS outbreak by Arthur Kleinman and James Watson who said:
Seen in the context of avian flu and the major outbreaks of flu in the twentieth century-most of which appear to have originated in south China-the SARS epidemics must be found. Virologists need to work in teams consisting of ecologists, biologists, soil scientists, economists, political scientists, demographers, epidemiologists, anthropologists and ethicists. This is the only way we can hope to understand the intersection of ecological, social, and biological processes that underline emergent infectious diseases. At issue here are the migration of waterfowl, the intensive cultivation of ducks, chickens, and pigs in settings of dense human habitation, trade in and sale of wild animals, the migration of Somewhere between parochialism and cosmopolitanism is a point where the abstract logic of the international and the very real concerns of the local meet. The meeting point does not have to be as belligerent as per DuBois and Wake, who argue that the most recent Ebola outbreak has set the scene for what will be a "battleground between health security, humanitarian health and the authority of transnational institutions" in the future. But the tension between international 302 and local concerns can produce a positive outcome, thus contributing to a multifaceted and integrated approach that is not only sensible in terms of diversity of knowledge systems, but also legitimate to a degree not yet experienced.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article offered a chronicle of the rise and fall of two notable epidemics of the modern world. In utilizing a trans-disciplinary lens in considering the international, operational and national legal frameworks in which these two epidemics ran its course, it is shown that the extent of biomedical knowledge available on a disease, an epidemic, or a public health emergency has little bearing on how successful states and the international community at large will be in effectively responding thereto. The first Ebola outbreak occurred in 1976 in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire) and much of the findings of the Zaire and Sudan Commissions that were established in the immediate aftermath of these outbreaks still hold true today. Yet, with the most recent Ebola outbreak in which more than 27,200 people were infected and more than 111,000 died, serious questions have been raised about the preparedness of the international community and its representative structures in dealing with public health emergencies. This stands in stark contrast to the 2003 SARS outbreak on which no scientific bio-medical information was available at the outset of the epidemic, but the epidemic was successfully contained within months of the first reported case and with only 774 attributable deaths.
These two notable public health emergencies remain important in evaluating international and operational responses to disease control as both gave rise to "historic" developments in terms of the international legal regulation of disease. The current legal instrument for the control of the spread of disease, the IHR (2005), is a direct culmination from the 2003 SARS outbreak. Additionally, the recent Ebola outbreak led to the UN Security Council adopting Resolution 2177, confirming the Ebola outbreak to be a threat to international peace and security and establishing UNMEER as a temporary measure to coordinate the work of U.N. entities with other organisations and all governments involved. However, these two outbreaks also confirmed the paradox of being "a global village in a divided world;" as we were again reminded of how increasingly interdependent 
